The analytic overview will include a description of the difference of opinion that lies at the heart of the discourse, the point of departure chosen in dealing with the difference, the arguments put forward in order to resolve it, the argumentation schemes employed in these arguments, the argumentation structure, et cetera.

In analysing argumentative discourse we assume that the discourse is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion and that the argumentation and every other speech act performed in the discourse with a view of resolving the difference can be regarded as part of a critical discussion. Starting from this assumption, we have developed a pragma-dialectical model of the course of the resolution process, its stages and the various types of speech act instrumental in each of these stages. Analytically, in the process of resolving a difference of opinion four stages can be distinguished: confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion.

The model of a critical discussion serves as a heuristic tool in the analytic process of reconstructing all those implicit or otherwise opaque speech acts encountered in ordinary argumentative practice that are relevant to a critical evaluation of the discourse. The reconstruction entails a number of analytic operations that are instrumental in identifying the elements in the discourse which may play a part in resolving a difference of opinion.^[2] A central problem in the analysis is that the reconstruction should be both relevant to the interests of normative analysis and faithful to the intentions and understandings of the ordinary actors who produce the discourse.

2. Instrumental rationality in ordinary discourse

In Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs have made an effort to explain to their readers how pragma-dialectical analysis works. Pragma-dialecticians take it that in every form of communication and interaction by means of speech acts, argumentation in particular, there is a certain normativity involved:

Ordinary language users engaged in argumentative discourse characteristically try to comply with certain critical standards and expect others to maintain these standards. They may be assumed to share an orientation towards resolving a difference of opinion and a commitment to norms that are instrumental for this purpose. The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is, in fact, a description of what argumentative discourse would look like if it were solely and optimally aimed at resolving a difference.^[3]

In practice, people who take part in argumentative discourse often appear to be engaged in pursuing quite other goals than resolving a difference of opinion. Sometimes, for instance, speakers or writers are eager to be perceived as nice or wise. Nevertheless, even if other goals may be important, they do not always prevent people from pursuing at the same time the goal of resolving a difference of opinion. It may well be the case that the other goal is in some way helpful in resolving the difference.^[4] In this general and weak sense, there is a rhetorical (pragmatic) aspect to all argumentative discourse: the participants are always aiming for the effects that suit them best.

In our view, there is also a rhetorical aspect to argumentative discourse in a more specific or strong sense: people who take part in argumentative discourse try to resolve the difference of opinion in their own favour, and their use of language and other aspects of their behaviour are designed to achieve precisely this effect. This does, of course, not mean that the participants are exclusively interested in getting things their way. As a rule, they will at least pretend to be primarily interested in having the difference of opinion resolved. People who engage in argumentative discourse may be considered committed to what they have said or implicated. If a move is not successful, they can not escape from their dialectical responsibility by just saying "I was only being rhetorical". Although they may try as hard as they can to get their point of view accepted, they have to maintain the image of people who play the resolution game by the rules.

The balancing of people's resolution-minded objective with the rhetorical objective of having their own position accepted regularly gives rise to strategic manoeuvring as they seek to fulfil their dialectical obligations without sacrificing their rhetorical objectives. They attempt to make rhetorical use of the opportunities offered within the dialectical situation in order to conclude the difference of opinion in their own favour. Starting from the assumption that rhetoric may be considered to operate within a dialectical framework, we shall be investigating in what way insight into the rhetorical strategies used in resolving a difference of opinion can be helpful to deepening and strengthening the pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse. After a general exposition of our approach, we shall concentrate on the confrontation stage of a critical discussion and illustrate our method of analysis by reconstructing some rhetorical elements in a discussion about the legitimacy of fox hunting conducted in Great-Britain in the Summer of 1997.

3. Rhetorical and dialectical approaches

Can rhetorical insight indeed be combined with dialectical insight? In order to be able to answer the question satisfactorily, we think that it is worthwhile to have a better look at rhetorical theory, starting with classical rhetoric. Although rhetoric has developed into various directions, there is a common theoretical basis that expresses itself in some shared starting points.

In Plato's Gorgias, the existence of any valid art of rhetoric is called into question, but in his Phaedrus Socrates describes the possibility of an ideal, philosophical rhetoric. According to Kennedy (1991)--and who would deny his observation?--Aristotle's Rhetoric provided the conceptional framework for the study of rhetoric. In Aristotle's definition, rhetoric is "an ability or capacity (dynamis) in each case to see the available means of persuasion". He regarded arguments as the essential body of proof. Ernest Havet (1846), as quoted in Murphy and Katula (1994: Ch. 3) even observed that "Aristotle reduces rhetoric to argumentation".^[5]

It is customary to distinguish two traditions in the subsequent history of rhetoric: a more philosophical Aristotelian tradition, emphasizing logical aspects, and an Isocratian tradition, concentrating on style and literary aspects (cf. Kennedy 1991: 12).^[6] Cicero's De oratore shows predominantly Isocratian influences in addition to Aristotelian influences.^[7] According to Kennedy, it is not an overstatement to say that, until Quintilian's Institutio oratoria was rediscovered in the fifteenth century, the history of rhetoric in western Europe is the history of Ciceronianism (1994: 158, 181). In after years a distinction is to be made between a philosophically-oriented persuasive rhetoric, inspired by Aristotle and Whately, which focuses on elements in the discourse that play a part in convincing an audience, and an elocutionary, decorative, belletristic Burkian rhetoric, which concentrates on the form and function of figures of style and meaning.^[8]

Although rhetoric has at an early stage developed into a separate tradition, there have always been authors who saw a connection between rhetoric and dialectic. Whereas Plato had opposed rhetoric to dialectic, for Aristotle it is the mirror image or counterpart (antistrophos) of dialectic. According to Green, as quoted in Zulick (1997), this phrase would indicate that they "do not merely resemble one another in a vague manner", but "could somehow be converted so that they could be understood as one another" (1990: 9-10). The principle differences are that dialectic deals with general and abstract questions and takes the form of question and answer, while rhetoric deals with specific cases and policies and uses extended formal speeches. For Cicero rhetoric is also disputatio in utramque partem, speaking on both sides of an issue. In De inventione dialectica libri tres (1479/1991), one of the most important contributions to humanist argumentation theory, Agricola builds on Cicero's view that dialectic and rhetoric can not be separated and merges the two into one theory. In this endeavour, he also relies on Boethius, whose position in De topicis differentiis is that rhetoric can be subsumed under the heading of dialectic. In our approach, this idea is implemented by placing rhetoric within the dialectical framework for resolving differences of opinion.

Since antiquity various efforts have been made to reconcile the different conceptions of reasonableness which are involved in dialectic and rhetoric. As Murphy and Katula (1994: Ch. 2) observe, Aristotle assimilated in the Rhetoric the opposing views of Plato and the sophists. According to some modern theoreticians, however, the rhetorical norm of effectiveness is in contradiction with the conception of reasonableness that lies at the heart of dialectic.^[9] Other theoreticians maintain that argumentation that is rhetorically strong will as a rule comply with dialectical criteria (see Wenzel 1990). At any rate, as can be shown from Leeman's beautiful analysis of Caesar's one-word speech "Quirites" (1992), rhetorical effectiveness does not exclude dialectical scrutiny.^[10] The revaluation of classical rhetoric that has taken place over the past few years has led to a general acknowledgement that the a-rational-sometimes anti-rational--image of rhetoric must be revised. More or less as a consequence, the sharp opposition to dialectic should be moderated too: rhetoric as the study of effective techniques of persuasion is not per se incompatible with the critical ideal of reasonableness upheld in dialectic.^[11]

4. Using rhetorical insight in dialectical analysis

If it is indeed true that people engaged in argumentative discourse generally attempt to resolve the difference of opinion in their own favour, and rhetorical and dialectical approaches to the analysis of argumentative discourse are indeed compatible, then there should be no reason why dialectical analysis should not benefit from rhetorical insight into the strategic management of moves for the purpose of winning the game. The question then is which rhetorical strategies used in the discourse are dialectically acceptable. Although the concept of strategy evokes images of evasion, concealment and artful dodging, it also encompasses means employed to implement an ideal in accordance with one's own preferences. Rhetorical strategies in our sense are designs of discourse consisting in the deliberate and systematic use of opportunities available for carrying out moves aimed at resolving a difference of opinion to one's own advantage.

It is to be investigated which rhetorical strategies are used in the discourse in order to achieve the result aimed for by the speaker or writer. Rhetorical strategies may manifest themselves at three levels: in the selection of material, its adaptation to the audience, and its presentation. In order to achieve the optimal rhetorical result, the selected moves must be an effective choice from the available potential, the moves much be in such a way adapted to the audience that they comply with auditorial demands, and the presentation of the moves must be discursively and stylistically appropriate. At each of these three levels, the speaker or writer has a chance to influence the outcome of the discussion, and the influences may occur simultaneously. A rhetorical strategy is, in fact, optimally successful if the rhetorical efforts at the three levels converge, so that a fusion of persuasive influences is generated.

Each stage of the resolution process has a specific dialectical goal and therefore brings its own rhetorical goal with it. Since it depends on the phase the discourse has reached what kind of advantages can be gained by the speaker or writer, the rhetorical effects are to be specified according to dialectical stage. In each of the four stages of the resolution process the parties involved in a difference of opinion can, at each of the three levels, attempt to make the strategic choice that serves their interests best. In the confrontation stage they will, taking due account of auditorial demands and opting for the strongest presentation, attempt to make the most effective choice from the potential offered by the available disagreement space, for instance by making a choice for dealing with the procedural status. In the opening stage, where the starting points for the discussion are established, they can, for instance, attempt to elicit by way of rhetorical questions those concessions from their interlocutors that constitute the starting points that agree most with their own interests. In the argumentation stage, they will attempt to make a strategic selection from the loci that are available in the case concerned, adapt their line of defence to the criticisms that can be anticipated, and suggest by the phrasing of their arguments that these arguments are relevant as well as sufficient. And in the concluding stage they may attempt to end with a conclusive statement that finishes off all criticisms, presenting it perhaps as a punchline, like in the close of the following implicit discussion, taken from John LeCarré's A Perfect Spy: "Do you love your old man? Well then".

5. Instrumental rationality in confrontation

When illustrating how insight into the use of rhetorical strategies can be helpful to achieving an adequate analysis of argumentative discourse, we shall concentrate on strategical manoeuvring in the confrontation stage. Analysis of the confrontation stage involves identifying the positions adopted by the participants in the difference of opinion.^[12] A difference of opinion manifests itself in argumentative discourse when a speaker's statement is met with--real or pro-jected--doubt or contradic-tion on the part of an interlocutor, so that a disag-reement, or potential disagreement, arises. If it is clear that a disagreement exists, then the statement that is met with doubt is to be analysed as a standpoint and the doubt or contradiction as an expression of non-acceptance. Both can be defined as speech acts that can be characterized in terms of felicity conditi-ons.

As van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993) explain, not only the speaker's statement itself, but also the ensuing propositions may receive the status of a standpoint. Each speech act implies a large number of underlying assumptions that are arguable and constitute the 'disagreement space' created by that speech act. The disagreement space is a structured set of possible standpoints associated with an act. At least part of the disagreement space of a speech act is substantiated--in terms of beliefs, wants, and intentions--in the felicity conditions of that act. If one of these beliefs, wants or intentions is promoted to a discussion issue by the interlocutor, the speaker is required to defend a standpoint on that issue.^[13] Such a standpoint has not been put forward as such, but has been attributed to the speaker by the interlocutor; it is therefore called a virtual standpoint. Virtual standpoints are hierarchical-ly organized with respect to the superordi-nate speech act from which they ensue; they are structured by the issues associated with that superordinate act.^[14] It is largely on the basis of the follow-up by the interlocutor that the analyst will be able to select the standpoint at issue among the possible standpoints in the disagreement space of an arguable act.^[15]

Analysing argumentative discourse as if it were aimed at resolving a dispute means that the disagreement is reconstructed in terms of the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. The analysis starts from the assumption that the difference of opinion is approached in a reasonable, not to say dialectical, way. Those involved are assumed to view it as an occasion for overcoming doubt or opposition and expect each other to deal with this doubt or opposition by advancing reasonable arguments. In order to enable the difference to be resolved on the merits, the issues concerned are to be fully externalized in the discourse.^[16]

It is obvious that confronting one's standpoint with the opinions of others will often serve other than dialectical goals, such as provocating or annoying the others. There may also be aims involved in presenting a standpoint which affect the resolution of a difference immediately but are not strictly dialectical, such as winning the discussion. Someone who enters a confrontation will, as a rule, attempt to define the disagreement in such a way that his chances of winning are optimal. For this purpose, he will give a rhetorically sound presentation of his own stance and that of his interlocutor.^[17]

At first sight, the rhetorical aim of obtaining a favourable position in the confrontation seems contrary to the dialectical aim of dispute resolution, but this is not necessarily the case. As long as the confronter does not obscure the difference by mystifying the mutual positions or tries to immunize his standpoint against criticism, there is nothing wrong with making an attempt to shape the difference in a way that enables him to promote a resolution in his own favour. The only thing that is not permitted is to be contra-dialectic, i.e., to reduce the possibilities of achieving a reasonable resolution of the dispute.

Once it is recognized that rhetorical aims can play a legitimate part in a dialectical confrontation, it can also become clear that discussants are prone to manoeuvre in such a way as to fulfil these aims. Such strategical manoeuvring in a confrontation will be primarily aimed at defining the issue of disagreement in a way that is favourable to the speaker. Since this defini-tion influences the outcome of the confrontation, it will also influence the participants' chances of winning the ensuing discussion.^[18] In obtaining a clear view of a particular confrontation and the difference of opinion the participants attempt to resolve, the analyst can benefit from a better understanding of these strategical manoeuvrings.

In the confrontation stage, the speaker can, first, make a strate-gic selection from the disagreement space potential inherent in the arguable act. If the act is non-assertive, its felicity conditions are the main source for identifying this potential. If the act is an assertive, classical status theory provides a specification of the felicity conditions, which can be refined even further by differentiating between the various types of proposition to which the assertive may pertain (descriptive, evaluative or inciting). Second, the speaker can put the issue in a perspective that accords with the views of the antagonist or the audience. Third, the speaker can make use of presentational devices that enforce his position upon the audience, for instance, by choosing formulations that attribute positive connotations to his case.

6. Rhetorical ways of choosing from the disagree-ment space

We shall now illustrate our views by analysing the confrontational aspects of some contributions to a recent discussion on fox hunting in Great-Britain. This discussion ensued from the introduction of an anti-hunting bill by a Labour Member of Parliament, Michael Foster. The text fragments we shall analyse are taken from leading articles, commentaries and letters to the editor from two British newspapers, the Guardian (July 10 and 11, 1997) and the Times (July 11, 1997), and the Dutch newspaper Het Parool (July 10, 1997).

According to the British Field Sports Society, there are more than three hundred organized fox hunts a year, involving 215.000 people and up to 20.000 trained hounds. The fox hunt provides about 14.000 jobs and around 20.000 foxes a year get killed. The disputants agree that the number of foxes need to be controlled, but there is disagreement about how this is to be achieved. Shooting, trapping and poisoning are mentioned as alternatives, but they all have their disadvantages.

At the first level of confrontational rhetorical strategy, the issue that is to be discussed is selected from the available disagreement space. Since this discussion is initiated by the dialectical question whether fox hunting should be forbidden, the disagreement space can in terms of classical status theory be specified into four kinds of status. The first, coniectura, is, of course, not opportune: it is no use discussing whether there is indeed something like a fox hunt. The remaining three kinds of status are whether fox hunting is to be regarded as unacceptably cruel (definitio), whether it can be exonerated (qualitas), and whether it is a suitable subject for governmental decision-making (translatio).

Some defenders of hunting make an attempt to handle the status of definitio. This status was introduced by Michael Foster, who claimed that hunting is "a cruel, barbarian practice that should have been terminated centuries ago, just as happened to cock fighting, bear baiting and dog fighting". The conservationist David Bellamy implicitly rejects this view by pointing out that "the real cruelty" is "the battery hen and the veal pens". In a letter to the editor, Melvin Goldsmith from Purleigh makes the same point, albeit ironically:

Tally ho! Yes, let's ban the fox hunting--then let's ban those ghastly cruel and fatal horse races like the Grand National--then let's put up the price of food by banning the far larger cruelty of factory farming.

The defenders have a preference for the qualitas status, substantiating their point by referring to the existence of a hallowed tradition. Michael Heseltine, the former Conservative Deputy Prime Minister, calls the bill "a vicious on-slaught on a treasu-red tradition of rural life". Arnold Harvey, editor of Horse and Hound, even declares his willingness "to go into prison to defend our heritage". The strongest appeal to tradition, however, comes from the Labour peer Lady Mallalieu:

Hunting is our music, it is our poetry, it is our art [...]. It is where many of our best friendships are made. It is our community. It is our whole way of life.

The translatio status is also brought into the debate. Nicholas Wibberley from Barnstaple writes ironically:

Sir, It is absurd that hunting should be a national government issue. It would be better devolved to parish councils.

Wibberley clearly does not think that fox hunting is a suitable subject for governmental decision-making.

It is remarkable that Heseltine and other representatives of the pro-hunting party seem to suggest that the debate is not at all about hunting, but about the threats posed to the traditions of rural life and to the countryside. One may wonder why they make such a point of these traditions. In order to understand what is happening, the analyst needs to see that, for the pro-hunters, the issue of cruelty is hard to deal with; and also that the pro-hunters have not themselves advanced a standpoint on that issue, but a standpoint has been attributed to them.^[19] It is therefore a sensible strategy for them to put the issue of cruelty to the background by foregrounding the issue of the traditions of the countryside. Combining this focus on tradition with something so inherently positive as rural life results in a very powerful argument, whose force is not diminished by the fact that the opponents of fox hunting discard such traditions as outmoded.

7. Rhetorical ways of answering auditori-al demands

The second level of confrontational strategy consists in strategically dealing with auditorial demands. In the discussion on fox hunting, the topics of discussion are put in a perspective that is expected to appeal to the general public. The defenders of fox hunting give 'presence' to the connection between fox hunting and the protection of rural life. "A ban on hunting", writes the Times, "changes forever the rhythm of rural usage". According to hunter Sam Butler, "the countryside will [then] change its appearance forever". Het Parool observes that, "first and foremost, the leaders present themselves as protectors of countryside traditions against meddlers from the city".

Some pro-hunters attempt to gain the audience's approval by emphasizing the divisive effects of the bill. Among them is the new leader of Her Majesty's official opposition, the countryman Willam Hague, who--alluding to Disraeli's famous statement--warns that "The bill is creating two nations, by setting town against country". The Duke of Roxburgh (Guy to friends), on the other hand, is of the almost leftist opinion that hunting is "a good way of linking social classes". Socialism appears to inspire Michael Heseltine as well. According to the Guardian, "the man who dismantled the mining industry" claimed that "this bill would destroy communities, damage fragile environments and destroy jobs".

The perspective of freedom is generally considered to be most appealing to the audience. Alex Bowles, regional director of the British Field Sports Society, asserts that "people do feel threatened: their liberty is being taken away, their privacy threatened". To Mr Heseltine's mind, the Bill "represents an intolerance out of character with the finest traditions of British freedom". According to the Guardian, "it took the Labour Peer Lady Mallalieu to make the wider points: 'It's about freedom of people to choose how they live their lives. It is about the tolerance of minorities'".

If the pro-hunting party is to be believed, the anti-hunting party favours the perspective of the class-war. William Hague, for one, puts it quite bluntly: "Labour appear to believe that they are re-fighting the old class war". John Severs from Durham City resists this perspective:

It is not envy of the rich and privileged that leads me to oppose fox and stag hunting but the torment suffered by the animals while they are being pursued. [...] It is a matter of principle.

Bel Littlejohn, columnist of the Guardian, after giving a lively description of the pro-hunters' appearances, ridicules the denials of the antis that they take a class-war perspective:

The assembled speakers--mainly toffee-nosed, chinless-wonder Old Etonians in expensive tweeds, their estates funded by their bastard ancestors' ill-gotten gain in the slave trade--tried to make out that those of us in the anti-bloodsport camp are motivated by class hatred. What nonsense! Frankly, I don't give a damn how these upper-class twits, Lloyds' losers, serial adulterers, snooty layabouts and self-confessed wife-beaters choose to get their rocks off. [...] It's got nothing to do with class.

Altogether we have now discussed four perspectives that are supposed to appeal to the public: that of environmental care, that of the division between town and country, that of personal freedom, and that of social inequality. The first three are invoked by the pro-hunting party, the fourth supposedly by the anti-hunting party. In order to understand the strategic value of invoking these perspectives, the analyst has to rely primarily on background knowledge concerning the discussion and the parties involved. Such background knowledge will, for instance, make clear that if the perspective of class-war is invoked by the anti-hunting party, it must be intended to appeal to those who are of the opinion, and detest this, that England is still a class society. Since these people may already be expected to support the anti-hunting case, this is probably not too strong a strategy. On top of that, it can, as we have seen, easily be ridiculed.

The perspectives invoked by the pro-hunting party have more strategic power. They all relate to the sphere of mind of those opposed to fox hunting. The majority of them may be supposed to be lovers of wildlife and nature in general: the fox hunters present themselves as guardians of nature. The opponents may be supposed to mind social inequality: the pro-fox hunters portray the anti-fox hunting bill as causing a division of 'two nations'. The opponents may be supposed to be protagonists of freedom: the pro-fox hunters do present themselves in the same way. By thus drawing upon the opponents' views, the pro-hunters respond most strategically to the auditorial demands.

8. Rhetorical ways of presenting confrontatio-nal moves

The third level of confrontational strategy is that of verbal presentation. Both parties make use of various stylistic devices to enforce their view of the difference upon the audience, most notably the creation and use of appealing images. Prominent among the images used by the pro-hunters is the oppression image, which comes down to presenting the anti-fox hunting lobby as oppressing people's personal rights. William Hague explicitly states: "I do not go hunting, but I defend people's right to do so. I think freedom is important even if it is unpopular". In a letter to the editor, Marie Herbert from Brightlingsea, Colchester, makes the following--pertinent--objection: "Why should a minority be allowed to indulge in a pastime which is repugnant to most?".

Another image created by the pro-hunting party is that of justified resurrection. Mr Heseltine promises to fight the anti-hunting bill "at every stage" in Parliament. Lady Mallalieu says the government had not been elected "to criminalise hundreds and thousands of our decent and law-abiding people. I hope we are not on the eve of a battle. We do not want one. But if there is one, the countryside will fight and we will win".

A third device used by the pro-hunters is creating a bucolic image of peaceful countrylife in need of protection. As Michael Heseltine put it: "The proposed bill is a vicious onslaught on a treasured tradition of rural life". The same role of self-appointed guardian of countrylife resonates in the mission statement of the countryside marches converging in Hyde Park: "This initiative arose as a response to the frustration and concern felt by country people against the threats posed to the countryside, and their jobs, by politicians and urban influence, through prejudice, ignorance, and diminishing rural representation".

The stylistic choices that are made in these contributions to the debate are entirely in agreement with the pathetic images just discussed. The earlier quotation showed that Lady Mallalieu proceeds in Churchillesque grand style.

This inventory of examples shows that the discussants tend to present the difference of opinion in a particular way. In order to be able to understand what is strategical about this presentation, the analyst needs to be familiar with the conventional stylistic devices and their effects as recognized in the study of rhetoric. In addition, he also needs to know about the ways in which particular presentations can promote the chances of achieving a favourable outcome of the confrontation for a participant, thus enhancing his chances of winning the discussion.

In the fox hunt discussion, the presentation of the difference by the pro-hunting party can at least be regarded as rhetorically strategical in so far as it makes use of the images of oppression, justified resurrection and peaceful countrylife. The effect of encapsulating the difference in these images is that the position of the protagonists of fox hunting is inherently justified: it is identified with the position of those who are oppressed, but stand up to their oppressors in the name of freedom. The idea of inherent justification is further strengthened by the formulations that are used. The pro-hunters' resurrection, for example, is justified because they are fighting for a noble cause: hunting is music, poetry, and art; they are not just being oppressed by the government, but by a tyrant who criminalises hundreds and thousands of decent and law-abiding people; and the hunters are not just hunters but freedom fighters, who will resist their oppressor, stand up, and fight to win.

9. Conclusion

Strategic manoeuvring works best when the rhetorical influences brought to bear at each of the three levels are made to converge. In the discussion of fox hunting, the pro-hunting party's strategies of selecting the issue to be discussed, drawing this issue into an audience-oriented perspective, and epitomizing it in certain images and phrasings, are systematically fused. The element that binds them together is the treasured past. It is referred to in the tradition issue, in the one nation, unspoilt countryside, rural life and freedom perspectives, and celebrated in the grand style appropriate to the great past. Rather than having just strategically manoeuvred, the pro-hunting party has thus indeed displayed a genuine rhetorical strategy.

NOTES

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